Security requirements for multi-operator virtualized network and service orchestration for 5G by Silva Santos, Mateus Augusto et al.
Security requirements for multi-operator
virtualized network and service
orchestration for 5G
Mateus Augusto Silva Santos and Alireza Ranjbar and Gergely Biczo´k and
Barbara Martini and Francesco Paolucci
Abstract The fifth generation of mobile networks (5G) will support new
business and service models. A particular model of business and technical in-
terest is multi-operator service orchestration, where service chains are created
dynamically with coordination across multiple administrative domains. In
such a scenario, resource sharing among operators is expected to be enabled
by emerging network softwarization technologies such as Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). On top of
the inherent security issues of network softwarization, the complex relation-
ships between operators add a unique dimension to the fundamental require-
ments for 5G networks. It is a key objective for network operators to identify
new threats and security issues before deploying novel methods for service
orchestration. This chapter elaborates on new security challenges posed by
multi-operator service orchestration as defined by the H2020 5G-PPP 5G
Exchange project. We revisit current standards and recommendations from
ITU-T and ETSI under the scope of SDN and NFV. In addition, we present a
method for threat analysis as well as gaps between requirements and current
security schemes and standards, opening new research directions.
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1 Introduction
The next generation of communications systems, 5G, will enable the deploy-
ment of diverse services with different networking requirements. Unlike earlier
generations which consider a general purpose network for all services, 5G will
be able to assign network services based on specific networking needs. As it
is envisioned by the 5G-PPP community, 5G will empower a diverse set of
verticals such as Factories of the Future (FoF), Health, Automotive and Me-
dia and Entertainment. In order to enable the deployment of differentiated
capabilities, 5G employs the end-to-end network slicing approach based on
virtualized resources [8, 7]. These slices require multi-operator orchestration
at both the business and technical levels. From the business point of view,
operators should negotiate and agree on a set of services that they are able
to provide. From the technical point of view, operators should be able to
assign (virtual) resources to services in an agile and flexible manner. Tech-
nologies such as NFV and SDN are key enablers for providing high flexibility
and manageability in service allocation and orchestration through 5G slices.
Moreover, since end-to-end 5G slices may span across different operators, se-
curity becomes of utmost importance. Operators should be able to negotiate
and deliver services without revealing sensitive configurations or part of their
virtual or physical resources to others. In addition, end-to-end slices may
require high level of isolation at the control, management and also at the
resource layer. Some control operations of each slice may need to be isolated
from other slices, and there should be a way to authenticate and monitor a
large number of virtual services deployed across multiple operators.
In the following, we review SDN and NFV as key technologies in 5G and
introduce our 5G multi-operator service orchestration architecture.
1.1 The Role of NFV and SDN in 5G
NFV and SDN will be an important part of 5G enabling the flexible, rapid
and cost efficient deployment of network services. NFV decouples software
from hardware and provides higher resource efficiency and scalable service
deployability by virtualizing the network functions and resources. The vir-
tualized services can be deployed on demand to achieve higher coverage or
capacity. Another major benefit of NFV is that it allows operators to im-
plement network services independent of the location. In fact, virtualized
services are not anymore bounded to physical networks and, depending on
the desired functionality, they can be implemented close to base stations (i.e.,
at the edge) or on a centralized data center.
While NFV is focused on virtualizing the network functions, SDN aims at
offering a higher level of control over network resources by centralizing the
control and management functions. SDN separates the control plane from
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the data (forwarding) plane; the control plane consists of a logically central-
ized and programmable controller, which has an abstract view of network
resources. The higher programmability and abstraction in SDN allows opera-
tors to define customized 5G logical slices with different sets of services. NFV
and SDN are complementary technologies in 5G. In fact, SDN can be part
of NFV framework, particularly to enhance the controllability and manage-
ability of NFV components.
1.2 Multi-Operator Orchestration Architecture
In order to have a common view of 5G resource sharing and orchestration
between operators, the 5GEx innovation project [1] proposed a hierarchical
architecture shown in Figure 1. At the highest level, customers and opera-
tors negotiate and agree on services; at the lowest level, virtual and physical
network resources are assigned to customers.
The architecture illustrates the relation between different entities with a
set of interfaces (I1 to I5). In this architecture, business agreements between
an operator and a customer (i.e., Business-to-Customer, B2C) will happen
through interface I1 while the operators negotiate (i.e., Business-to-Business,
B2B) for service allocation through interface I2. Based on the agreements,
the management entity in each provider network will request the domain
orchestrators through interface I3 to map resources to a specific network slice.
To offer end-to-end services, domain orchestrators may interact with each
other through interface I4. Lastly, domain orchestrators instruct controllers to
assign resources based on the technology deployed in the domain (e.g., SDN,
optical, etc.). It is important to emphasize that the 5GEx project focuses on
interfaces I1, I2 and I3.
The interaction between multi-domain orchestrators (MdOs) enables a ser-
vice to be orchestrated in a multi-provider environment. Specifically, MdOs
enable VNF instantiation on a third-party infrastructure through two fun-
damental components: Network Service Orchestrator (NSO) and Resource
Orchestrator (RO) [13]. NSO manages the lifecycle of network services in
coordination with VNF Managers. RO provides an overall view of the re-
sources within an administrative domain. An interesting observation is that
operators’ ROs can interact to expose slices in an abstracted and unified view
which can be consumed by an NSO that will expose services to a customer.
Thus, the split architecture of an MdO allows use cases such as network ser-
vices provided using multiple administrative domains (i.e., multiple NSOs
that compose services using cross-domain VNFs) as well as a network service
provided using multiple infrastructure providers (i.e., multiple ROs expose
a virtual data center to an NSO). We refer to the use cases #1 and #3 as
defined in [13] for more specific examples and descriptions.
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Fig. 1 5GEx Multi-Operator Orchestration Architecture [23]
In the next section, we discuss in more details the security requirements
of the 5G multi-operator architecture and particularly, we will focus on the
security of NFV and SDN as key enabler technologies for 5G. We consider
the functional split of MdOs to provide a more detailed analysis.
2 Security Perspectives from Standards Organizations
To elaborate the security requirements of multi-operator service orchestra-
tion, we first review the security architecture provided by ITU-T X.805 stan-
dard and then, we apply ITU-T security recommendations to interfaces of the
5GEx multi-operator architecture shown in Figure 1. In addition, we also re-
view some of the ETSI NFV recommendations for security of multi-operator
service orchestration in the following of this section.
2.1 ITU-T X.805
The ITU-T X.805 [5] provides recommendations for end-to-end network secu-
rity regardless of the underlying networking technology. Even though it was
published more than a decade ago, the recommendations are still very use-
ful to understand potential types of protection needed against threats. The
reason stems from the fact that the X.805 architecture is generic enough to
accommodate the existing challenges in network security, as we explain next.
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Fig. 2 X.805 security architecture
X.805 security architecture. Figure 2 shows the X.805 security architec-
ture, which comprises three architectural components: security dimensions,
security layers and security planes. Eight security dimensions are used to mea-
sure specific aspects of network security. Three security layers (infrastructure,
applications and services) provide a hierarchical structure for applying the
security dimensions to certain categories of network resources. Three secu-
rity planes (management, control, end-user) consist of a particular group of
network activities that should be protected by security dimensions.
The infrastructure security layer measures the security in network compo-
nents (i.e., switches and routers) and their communication links. The services
security layer applies security at services offered by a service provider, while
the applications security layer addresses the security of network-based appli-
cations. Since security for multi-operator networks is dealing with services,
we only need to apply the security dimensions to the services security layer
in the scope of each security plane.
According to the X.805 standard, the concept of protecting a network by
security dimensions at each security plane provides a comprehensive secu-
rity solution. As illustrated in Figure 3, different security dimensions protect
security planes. Focusing on the services security layer, we can define the
security planes as follows [5]:
• Management plane: concerned with securing the Operations, Administra-
tion, Maintenance & Provisioning functions of network services;
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Fig. 3 Architecture rationale: security dimensions protect security planes
• Control plane: securing the control or signaling information used by a net-
work service, including control messages of network devices participating
in the service;
• (End-)user plane: securing user data as it uses a network service. In the
context of multi-operator networks, the term “user” is the same as ”cus-
tomer” in Figure 1, which refers to either a service provider or an enterprise
customer. We replace the term end-user plane by user plane.
We now review and discuss security for each dimension by observing the
aforementioned planes. We group the security dimensions previously men-
tioned with conceptual intersections such as authentication and integrity with
non-repudiation, and data confidentiality with privacy.
Authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. X.805 states that data
integrity protects the information of network services against unauthorized
modification, deletion, creation, and replication. Non-repudiation is enabled
by providing a record, which identifies activities performed. We highlight that
information is defined according to the security planes mentioned earlier.
Authentication ensures that claimed identities are verified.
Data integrity and non-repudiation can be provided by using a hash chain;
essentially the successive application of a cryptographic hash function. Since
such method provides one-time signatures, it is well suited for protecting
management information; e.g., keeping track of management activities or
past logs. Connection-oriented interactions between MdOs, including control
information exchange, could be better secured with public-key cryptography
schemes such as digital signatures. Such a method provides authentication,
integrity and non-repudiation.
Table 1 shows the security planes as well as the 5GEx related interfaces
that can be protected in the context of authentication, data integrity and
non-repudiation. Note that we only consider the security of interfaces I1, I2
and I3, since they are the focus of the 5GEx project.
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Table 1 Authentication, integrity and non-repudiation combined with the security
planes of X.805
Planes Data authentication, integrity
and non-repudiation
Interfaces affected and pos-
sible countermeasures
Management Protect management informa-
tion and provide a record identi-
fying management activities per-
formed
I1, I2 for service man-
agement and VNF lifecy-
cle management. Protec-
tion with digital signatures
or hash chains.
Control Protect control information and
provide a record identifying the
origin of control messages. Ver-
ify identity that originates con-
trol information.
I1, I2 for service exposure.
I2, I3 for resource orches-
tration. Protection with
digital signatures.
User Protect user data being trans-
ported, verify its origin and pro-
vide a record identifying each
user and device that accessed
and used the network service and
the action that was performed.
Not directly applicable.
Access control. Access control ensures that only authorized identities or
devices are allowed to access services. This security service can be provided
with authentication servers, following an adapted version of the IEEE 802.1x
framework. Access control can also be provided by using encryption and
role-based controls. A policy database could be provided for user access dif-
ferentiation. Table 2 shows how the security planes can be applied to 5GEx
in the context of access control and authentication. We emphasize that only
interfaces I1, I2 and I3 are taken into account.
Data Confidentiality and Privacy. Confidentiality protects the infor-
mation from unauthorized access or viewing. Privacy ensures that no infor-
mation will be available to be used to identify the network service. Encryp-
tion schemes are useful for implementing confidentiality and privacy. Table 3
shows the 5GEx interfaces that could be affected by the security planes for
data confidentiality and privacy.
Availability. The availability security dimension ensures that there is no
denial of authorized access to services. Considering that access policies are
effective, availability can be provided by using logically centralized and phys-
ically distributed orchestrators per administrative domain. Table 4 presents
the 5GEx interfaces affected in the context of availability.
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Table 2 Access control combined with the security planes of X.805
Planes Access control Interfaces affected and pos-
sible countermeasures
Management Ensure only authorized identities
are allowed to perform manage-
ment activities of the network
service.
I1, I2 for requesting the in-
stantiation and configura-
tion of VNFs and SLA man-
agement. Protection can be
provided with encrypted
requests or authentication
servers.
Control Ensure that control information
for a network service originates
from an authorized source before
accepting it.
Not directly applicable
if user service request is
granted and persisted.
User Ensure that only authorized
users and devices are allowed to
access and use the network ser-
vice.
I1 for requesting services.
Protection with authentica-
tion servers that persist the
authorization.
Table 3 Data confidentiality and privacy combined with the security planes of X.805
Planes Data confidentiality and privacy Interfaces affected and pos-
sible countermeasures
Management Protect the network service’s
configuration and management
information. Ensure that no in-
formation can be used to identify
the network management service
system.
I1, I2 for service man-
agement and VNF lifecy-
cle management. Protec-
tion with encryption.
Control Protect network service control
information. Privacy for network
devices or communications links
participating in a network ser-
vice.
I1, I2 for service exposure.
I2, I3 for resource orches-
tration. Protection with en-
cryption.
User Protect user data that is being
transported, processed or stored
by a network service against
unauthorized access or viewing.
Privacy for information pertain-
ing to the user’s use of the ser-
vice.
Not directly applicable per
interface. Still an existing
trust issue (with regards to
user data flowing through a
provider without having an
established relationship).
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Table 4 Availability combined with the security planes of X.805
Planes Availability Interfaces affected and pos-
sible countermeasures
Management Ensure the ability to manage
network service cannot be denied
for authorized entity.
I1, I2 for SLA management,
VNF instantiation and con-
figuration as well as VNF
lifecycle management. Pro-
tection with multiple NSOs.
Control Ensure that network devices par-
ticipating in a network service
are always available to receive
control information from autho-
rized sources.
I2, I3 for resource orches-
tration. Protection with
multiple ROs.
User Ensure no denial of access to
the network service by autho-
rized users.
I1 for request of services.
Protection with multiple
NSOs.
2.2 ETSI NFV
ETSI Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) Industry Specification Group
(ISG) provides technical recommendations and standards for the adoption of
NFV, based on the network operator requirements. The ETSI NFV ISG has
published a list of security issues [4] which we discuss next with respect to
the multi-operator networks, while taking into account ETSI’s recommenda-
tions on security [3]. It should be noted that other concerns about security
of individual network elements or VNFs are out of the scope of this document.
Topology validation. Operators should be able to validate the connec-
tivity between all network elements, however, this process is often complex
especially because of the large number of virtualized functions. The topol-
ogy validation of VNFs is particularly important considering the end-to-end
slices in 5G, which require VNF orchestration across several virtual networks.
Operators should verify that the network connectivity satisfies the forward-
ing policy of VNF chains and each VNF deploys the intended functionality.
Also, it should be verifiable that the VNFs are connected to the correct vir-
tual network and the topology of VNFs should be free of loops, which could
be introduced accidentally or maliciously.
To improve VNF chaining across different operators, multi-domain orches-
trators should be able to instruct local SDN controllers to set up a path for
a specific chain of VNFs. However, orchestrators are expected to possess an
abstract view of network topology. Depending on the level of abstraction, the
ability of computing specific paths for VNFs is limited, leaving such task to
an SDN controller. Moreover, the SDN controller becomes a trusted entity
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to hold information about physical and virtual network resources. As a con-
sequence, if not secured, attackers may break into the centralized controller
and gain access to the physical and virtual topology information.
Performance and Network Isolation. Considering the 5G multi-operator
scenario in which a service spans across multiple administrative domains, vir-
tual networks might be deployed on several shared physical resources. There-
fore, it is important to isolate the virtual networks by creating logical slices
across all operators involved in the service. End-to-end slices will require a
standardized interface between multi-domain orchestrators so that each op-
erator may provide its own performance characteristic and network isolation
method.
Multi-Administrator Isolation. The hierarchy of administrators can be-
come a potential source of threats when it comes to delegation of control
or privileges between orchestrators of different administrative domains. It is
important to consider the privileges of administrators of virtualized networks
and functions.
User/Tenant Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA).
The multi-layer virtualization introduced by NFV may lead to AAA related
issues. Authentication may lead to the disclosure of end-user’s identities in a
federation of different NFV infrastructure providers. One solution is to vali-
date all identity tokens in VNF layers. Authorization can also introduce new
privilege challenges, as it requires rich policies to identify the authorized users
and tenants. The deployment of accounting for resource usage and billing pur-
poses can also be challenging especially because the VNFs may be deployed
at/by different operators. This requires granular traffic classification and ac-
counting between orchestrators.
Back-Doors via Virtualized Test and Monitoring Functions. Oper-
ators may provide a set of monitoring interfaces which can be used remotely
for provisioning, configuring, debugging and testing the VNFs. While oper-
ators may give certain privileges to each other for example, for performance
and quality monitoring, these interfaces should be properly hardened and
restricted against any unauthorized access by attackers or even by other op-
erators.
3 Threat Analysis Method
We provide a threat analysis over multi-operator networks according to the
method illustrated in Figure 4. Using a multi-provider scenario to specify
interactions we consider a selective list of threats and their reasons. Then, we
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Fig. 4 Proposed method for threat analysis
provide a list of potential security schemes that can protect the system against
the threats. Standards are also considered based on the study in Section 2.
Finally, we elaborate on gaps identified from schemes and standards.
3.1 Multi-provider Scenario
In order to understand the security aspects of a multi-provider environment
we consider the scenario of a wholesale infrastructure service, combining net-
work, storage and compute resources from multiple operators. A given service
provider, SPA, can create a service that involves other service providers’ in-
frastructure in a process that consists of the following steps:
1. Customer sends a service request to SPA;
2. SPA MdO decomposes the service into smaller service components;
3. SPA MdO maps service components to an inter-provider resource topology,
defining the SPs that will cooperate to deliver the network service and their
respective resources;
4. SPA MdO sends requests to other SPs MdOs involved in order to instan-
tiate the service components required (e.g., compute, storage).
Figure 5 illustrates the scenario. 5GEx Interface 1 (I1) is used in the first
step of the aforementioned process while the other steps are mostly defined
in Interface 2 (I2). Examples of control messages that should be exchanged
between MdOs are advertisement of resource topology and service catalog.
The former exposes available resources that a service provider intends to share
and the latter exposes available services. Exchange of control data between
peers of MdOs are subject to threats that we elaborate in the next sections.
3.2 Threat List and Reasons
Before discussing threats and their reasons it is important to understand the
relationship between an orchestrator and an SDN controller in terms of secu-
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Fig. 5 Interactions subject to threats in a multi-provider scenario
rity. Threats to an SDN controller can affect its corresponding orchestrator,
and vice versa.
An orchestrator usually operates right atop an SDN controller using a
defined interface for communication in the hierarchy. Such method is advo-
cated by European projects such as Unify [6] and 5GEx [1], with potentially
significant influence on the definition of future 5G networks. ETSI also ac-
knowledges the importance of an interface between an SDN controller and
an NFV orchestrator, being direct or indirect [12]. As an example of interac-
tion, a controller should be able to push network decisions in the data plane
using high level requests generated by orchestrators. Conversely, an orches-
trator should be able to receive network topology information from an SDN
controller, possibly with a level of abstraction (e.g., hiding specific details of
network devices). Moreover, ETSI states that topology information may be
passed along in both directions [12].
The list of threats provided here is inspired by the study of ITU-T X.805
security architecture (Section 2.1). In addition, recent studies identifying at-
tacks and vulnerabilities pertaining to the SDN/NFV domain are considered
(e.g., [9, 11, 24]).
Potential threats for the scenario discussed in Section 3.1 are as follows:
• destruction of information and/or other resources;
• disclosure of information;
• interruption of services;
• loss of confidence in secure trading between service providers.
The above-mentioned list of threats is not exhaustive but covers a broad
security spectrum for multi-operator networks as we discuss throughout this
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section. The following threat reasons will be taken into account in the dis-
cussions:
• hijack the orchestrator or the SDN controller;
• malicious/compromised applications;
• configuration issues;
• Distributed Denial of service (DDoS);
• repudiation of shared data.
Orchestrator hijacking and service interruption. An attacker that
gains access to an orchestrator or SDN controller can disrupt any kind of
communication within the network domain and affect inter-domain interac-
tions for service delivery and provisioning. Specifically, cooperation between
service providers can be affected due to packet loss or malicious forwarding
behavior in the data plane. For instance, a service may require packets to be
diverted to an ordered sequence of VNFs before reaching their final destina-
tion, a process known as service chaining. Such kind of forwarding behavior
can be realized over the SDN paradigm, i.e., an SDN controller configures
switches to apply a specific forwarding strategy to packets associated to a
service. Thus, an attacker can interrupt the service by changing the forward-
ing behavior programmed at the SDN controller. It also holds for an MdO,
since MdOs could interact with SDN controllers directly or indirectly.
SDN controller hijacking and destruction of information, privacy
issues. Destruction of information is also a possible consequence of SDN con-
troller hijacking. Data can be modified or corrupted as packets traverse the
network, since SDN-enabled switches can be programmed to modify packet
fields. Even though OpenFlow, the most noted SDN realization, mostly en-
ables the controller to program the forwarding elements up to layer 4 in the
stack, it is still possible to use SDN-enabled switches to modify any packet
field (e.g., using P41 programs). Also, some types of applications running
atop an SDN controller can be enabled to provide complete packet inspec-
tion and modification, possibly resulting in privacy issues due to disclosure
of information encapsulated in data packets.
A question that arises from the above discussions is the method that makes
it possible for an attacker to hijack orchestrators or SDN controllers. Ma-
licious applications can be used for hijacking purposes [9]. Northbound
applications atop an SDN controller or orchestrator should be provided with
security features so that remote access is only performed by authorized en-
tities. Any change in a resource state (e.g., forwarding element, database
system, computational resource) should be restricted to trusted applications
or monitored in real-time. Also, controllers and orchestrators should have
strong isolation properties to prevent applications from interfering with one
another.
1 http://p4.org/
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Configuration issues and disclosure of information. Threat reasons
are not restricted to malicious activities. In fact, misconfigurations in an
orchestrated network can lead to serious threats such as disclosure of infor-
mation. Configuration mistakes can lead the orchestrator to originate data
without authorization. In addition, configuration issues can lead to mistaken
or incorrect data sharing such as the case in which an orchestrator exposes
resources which the operator does not actually own.
Flooding, DDoS and interruption of services. DDoS attacks in which
multiple compromised hosts flood the network with packets is a notable form
of service interruption. A large number of requests to an orchestrator such
as service requests can prevent its functional modules from working properly.
For example, services offered by an MdO can become unavailable in case
advertisements of service catalog or resource topology are not performed as
expected. In addition, a large number of coordinated packets that traverse
the data plane can overload the SDN controller, requiring it to process too
many packets for flow rule decisions which can lead to service disruption in
the controller.
An important discussion is how an SDN controller and an orchestrator
make the network more susceptible to DDoS in comparison with other net-
working paradigms. A centralized element for the control plane is the main
reason for such vulnerability which also holds for an orchestrator. However,
the control plane can be physically distributed, enabling the use of methods
for controller placement to mitigate DDoS attacks. It is worth noting that
distributed SDN controllers will have to perform synchronization in order to
keep network state in a logically centralized fashion.
With respect to repudiation of shared data, an operator could claim to
not have originated data units. Specifically, the operator could have agreed
to share network resources but still denies such agreement or sharing. Non-
repudiation issues can affect the confidence to encourage trading opportu-
nities between service providers. A brief discussion on non-repudiation over
ITU-T X.805 is provided in Section 2.1.
Table 5 presents an example of mapping threats and their reasons based
on the discussions above.
Table 5 Summary of threats and their reasons
Threat Reasons
Destruction of information and/or
privacy issues
SDN controller hijacking
Malicious/compromised applications
Disclosure of information
Orchestrator/SDN controller hijacking
Configuration issues
Interruption of services
Distributed Denial of service (DDoS)
Orchestrator/SDN controller hijacking
Trading confidence between SPs Repudiation of shared data
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3.3 Security Schemes
Before reviewing potentially applicable security schemes and countermea-
sures, it is important to emphasize cryptographic protocol suites that provide
basic services such as authentication and encryption. For example, Internet
Protocol Security (IPSec) provides end-to-end security in the IP layer. IPSec
can be used to protect data flows between a pair of hosts, a pair of secu-
rity gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. Another example
is Transport Layer Security (TLS), which allows client/server applications to
communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering
or message forgery [2]. TLS is designed in particular for communications over
a reliable transport protocol such as TCP. A brief comparison between IPSec
and TLS draws the attention to the fact that the latter protects applica-
tion streams while IPSec connects hosts to entire private networks, including
across a public network.
Table 6 presents potential countermeasures against the threat reasons
(thus, threats).
Table 6 Potential security schemes and countermeasures
Threat Reason Possible Countermeasure
Orchestrator/SDN controller
hijacking
Restrict malicious/compromised applica-
tions with application containerization.
Configuration issues Real-time policy checker.
DDoS Physically distributed SDN controllers;
detect attack and redirect legitimate traf-
fic to a new server address.
Repudiation of shared data Digital signatures over ITU-T X.509.
The impact of malicious application behavior can be restricted or pre-
vented by using (or providing support to) application containerization [24].
Note that network applications can be statically compiled with the controller
code or instantiated as a dynamic module with the controller software. Con-
tainerization allows for authenticating the application during setup, and con-
trolling the application’s access rights on the infrastructure. In addition, con-
tainerization can limit and isolate the resource usage for each application.
To detect disclosure of information caused by configuration issues, it is pos-
sible to use policy checker mechanisms such as the work in [22]. In an SDN
network, the controller is aware of the network state because it is responsible
for flow rule decision and creation. Thus, SDN allows the verification of cor-
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rect forwarding behavior. A policy verification example is “traffic originated
from hosts A and B should never leave the domain during working time”.
One of the major challenges in policy verification is the separation of different
types of traffic using fine-grained policy checking, since the SDN controller
can set forwarding rules based on network identifiers, and it has a limited
view on the type of traffic, e.g., application identifiers. This can be improved
by using external traffic classifiers and deep packet inspection mechanisms in
the network. To perform policy checking in case of multiple controllers in the
network, it is also important to synchronize the network-wide state among
all distributed controllers.
Since centralization of control makes an SDN network more susceptible
to DDoS attacks, the immediate solution is to physically distribute the con-
trol plane. Detecting DDoS is another possible countermeasure, having traffic
volume as a trigger for an SDN application that also blocks malicious traffic.
For instance, the work in [18] provides the following method: a blocking ap-
plication sits atop the SDN controller and establishes a secure channel with
the server under protection against DDoS - the server can be an orchestrator
or an MdO. The secure channel is used by the server to notify the blocking
application in case of DDoS attacks, and subsequently, the blocking applica-
tion safely provides the server with a new IP address at which the service
should resume. As a result, legitimate traffic is redirected from the attacked
server address to a new address. Another method to prevent DDoS attacks
is to use rate limiters at the data plane to detect the abnormal traffic that
goes beyond a threshold value.
3.4 Gaps
Mapping security requirements to existing solutions in the literature, includ-
ing recommendations from standards, draws the attention to at least three
important topics: trust, Path Computation Element confidentiality and pri-
vacy between operators. We next discuss these gaps before providing final
considerations and concluding this chapter.
Trust Relationships between Operators. A Certification Authority
(CA) allows trust relationships by building, maintaining and revoking digital
certificates. These processes can be used within any given NFV context [3].
Note that a certificate verifies that a public key is owned by a particular
entity, but it does not imply the trustworthiness of the key owner. This and
other aspects of trust should be taken into account when using Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
Should PKI be used for trust, we refer to the ITU-T X.509 to address
some of the security requirements. The ITU-T X.509 can be seen as a hierar-
chical trust model for authentication [17]. It defines a certification authority
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tree in which a certificate within a local community is signed by a CA that
can be linked into this tree. Such a rigid hierarchical structure may not be
aligned with NFV-specific trust goals, since trust is highly dynamic and trust
measures can combine a variety of assurance elements that include identity,
attribution, attestation and non-repudiation [3]. Thus, as far as trust is con-
cerned, a trust objective should be defined before considering the use of PKI
over the recommendations of ITU-T X.509.
PCEP Confidentiality in Multi-Operator Networks. In the context
of 5GEx, a candidate mechanism for establishing inter NSP (Network Service
Provider) connectivity is the combined usage of BGP-LS (Border Gateway
Protocol-Link State) for abstracted topology dissemination at provider level
and PCE (Path Computation Element) for the actual path computation and
instantiation of connectivity. In the case of inter-domain path computation,
the end-to-end inter-domain path is a concatenation of intra-domain path
segments resulting from cascaded PCE-to-PCE cooperative communications.
Definitely, the PCE architecture can be considered as de-facto standard to
effectively deploy TE in multi-domain networks [14]. However, despite of au-
thentication, authorization and encryption mechanisms [19], confidentiality
issues still might arise inherently due to the exchange of information on net-
work resource availability (e.g., link bandwidth) aimed at the inter-domain
LSP set-up. In fact, the information exchanged in inter-PCE communications
can be used in a malicious way. Although the inter-NSP topology exchanged
by means of BGP-LS represents an abstract topology with aggregated TE
metrics and values, confidential information (e.g., the amount of available
bandwidth in a inter-provider link) may be inferred. In fact, a requester PCE
is not forced to actually set-up the returned path by triggering a signaling
in the network. Thus, a malicious requester PCE might issue a sequence of
bogus, although formally licit, computation requests to a PCE belonging to
a different domain with the only purpose of processing the returned replies
to infer network resource availability information in other domains. For in-
stance, multiple requests with the same destination node and different values
of requested bandwidth might be submitted to a PCE. Instead of establish-
ing the path, the obtained replies with bandwidth availability can be used
to derive possible bandwidth bottlenecks towards the specified destination.
This represents a security weakness that might be exposed by a NSP for
obtaining valuable advantages in terms of market share by leveraging on
potential failures and weaknesses of concurrent providers. Such a misuse of
the path computation services might prevent a beneficial cooperation among
PCEs belonging to different NSPs and compromise the dynamic provision
of end-to-end LSPs. In fact, a PCE might not have an interest in process-
ing a request if it is arriving from a competitor provider or if some security
threat is perceived that is likely to cause any operational or economic damage.
Therefore, inter-PCE interactions could be extended with 1) malicious PCEP
usage discovery techniques [16] and 2) trust-based and incentive-compatible
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Fig. 6 Multi-operator service chaining and information flow [15]
mechanisms to discourage the misuse of path computation services while
stimulating effective interactions among PCEs [10, 21].
Privacy in Collaborative Service Delivery. Cross-domain orchestration
of resources over multiple administrative domains enables collaborative ser-
vice delivery, i.e., services can be realized via chaining (or sequence) of VNFs
over domains of multiple operators. In this case, while a VNF runs on the in-
frastructure of one operator, policies can come from another operator, which
motivates an operator to encrypt its traffic in order to hide business or tech-
nical strategies. The aforementioned example is only one out of many possible
use cases for privacy in collaborative service delivery. For instance, user data
traffic could also be impacted (see Figure 6). Thus, there is a need for security
mechanisms and standards for enabling private VNFs [15].
4 Research Challenges and Future Directions
Resource sharing in a multi-party service delivery requires, among other
things, a flexible and programmable infrastructure. Such flexibility is a key
enabler for efficient 5G services through network slices [8], adapting to service
demands and meeting the requirements of emerging use cases.
In the context of security, network slices require strong isolation properties.
Slices should not interfere with one another so that faults are not propagated
through the network. Resilience and robustness are important in mission-
critical business services such as public safety networks in which hierarchical
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SDN controllers can provide increased security features [20]. Other research
challenges include trust, confidentiality and evolved privacy solutions, as dis-
cussed in Section 3.4.
Multi-operator service orchestration and delivery in 5G brings intensified
security concerns. This chapter has provided discussions on security require-
ments and threats related to service orchestration; moreover, potential solu-
tions for securing 5G networks have been discussed. As operators want to be
completely confident when hosting third party service components in their
infrastructures, such mapping of the threat landscape and threat mitigation
strategies is essential. We argue that with the right design choices, future 5G
networks will be able to meet the increasingly complex security requirements.
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